Can genuine moral laws exist without God? An analysis of Anscombe and Korsgaard

This is the first of two essays I wrote for 24.02: Moral Problems and the Good Life in spring 2024. Pulling on Anscombe's infamous "Modern Moral Philosophy" and Korsgaard's first edition of The Sources of Normativity, I was made to answer the question "Can genuine moral laws exist without God?" Below, I will explain the question and what follows from its answer, develop an argument for answering "no" pulling mainly from Anscombe, and then introduce the common Kantian rebuttal. I have made some light edits for clarity.

Alongside the above two texts, I also cite a relevant handout by the class' lecturer-in-charge, Sam Berstler.

Much of modern moral philosophy appeals to the idea that we are obligated, or required, to do what is morally right. This concept in the West is heavily influenced by Christianity (Anscombe, pg. 5); in religion, you can look to sets of obligations like the Ten Commandments for guidance on a moral problem. As advancements in science began to cast doubt on the legitimacy of faith, philosophers looked for ways to save moral obligation without need for God, and arrived at voluntarism. However, philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe believes that moral obligation cannot exist without Him, as moral obligation defines itself as existing outside of human nature. First, I will define what constitutes a moral law and a moral legislator. Second, I will explain why Anscombe believes moral obligation without God is nonsensical. Third, I will show why Anscombe’s derivations are important. Finally, I will refute her argument by introducing independent realism.

A moral law is a rule someone is required to follow when taking actions with moral consequences. (Korsgaard, 22). Consider the moral law "you cannot kill other people." This statement, like many moral laws, restricts what actions one can commit. Because this law designates killing people as immoral, you must avoid doing so to stay moral yourself. Note the contrast with another, conflicting, law: "you can kill other people." The "not" in "cannot" is doing a lot of work in the first law. When it’s removed, you are no longer required to kill or not kill anyone; you must look to other laws and ultimately your own desires to figure out what you will do. Other "moral verbs" include "ought," "must," and "should"; each can be negated with "not."

Rules, by definition, need some entity to enforce them (Anscombe, 2), so moral laws need legislators. Without a legislator, one would always be free to abandon their obligations. A legislator must be both supreme and legitimate. A legislator must be supreme in the sense that they must be able to impose sanctions on those who ignore their obligations. Through application of punishment, they are able to establish credibility. A legislator must be legitimate in the sense that they cannot command you to do evil things (Korsgaard, 26-29; Berstler, 2-3). For example, in Christian belief, the Lord is the moral legislator. He establishes credibility through his ability to send people to hell, a place of torment, if they ignore their moral obligations.

It would seem that, by the two requirements of being a legislator, only God-like entities can be legislators. Philosopher Hugo Grotius holds the belief that moral laws are not a part of human nature, but are imposed onto us. This implies that the legislator must be beyond our nature to truly enforce moral laws. In a practical sense, any legislator less than a god fails to enforce moral laws (Anscombe, 6). For example, you can’t be your own legislator because you can always choose to ignore your own laws, and sentiment nor cultural convention cannot act as legislators because they can tell you to do evil things (Anscombe, 3).

This result is significant because we regularly appeal to moral authorities that give and attempt to enforce moral obligations. We fit into society else face ostracization, follow the law else receive criminal punishment. It would seem that one’s religion (assuming the non-existence of God), community, or government does not have the ability to say anything about morality, as the legislators of these "laws" aren’t up to task. Furthermore, voluntarism also matches many popular schools of thought in philosophy in terms of being structured around laws and lawgivers, and so those schools are subject to the same issues. For example, sentimentalism tells one to look to their feelings for moral legislation, while Kant expects one to be their own lawgiver, searching for moral maxims that can be treated as law. Again, the issue of improper legislators rears its ugly head. Anscombe would lead us to believe that this general train of thought in Western moral philosophy is a dead end.

One might rebuke Anscombe, arguing that moral laws do not impose on nature, but are part of it. This is the viewpoint of independent realism. In this framework, moral laws don’t come from God, but simply exist out in the world; our role as philosophers is to discover them (Korsgaard, 33). This view is similar to how work is done in mathematics, in that we are focused on having revelations about the properties of systems (in our case, morality). In this sense, fulfilling one’s obligations is an innate duty of a human being, and so doesn’t require a legislator of any kind.